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1. Introduction
The strategic importance of Central Asia not only relies on the prospering wealth of 
the region but is also determined from theperspective of regional and international 
security. The newly independent countries of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan 
found themselves at the beginning of the New World Order (Farkhod 2007). 
Undoubtedly, September 11 events triggered a turning point in the security politics 
of Central Asia. US military engagement with the Central Asian countries has 
accelerated fighting radical Islamist extremism in Afghanistan and has influenced
the written and unwritten rules in the region.Another turning point seems to be the 
withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in 2014. Since the start of NATO 
operations in Afghanistan, there has been no radical change in terms of potential
threats and this country posesincludingradical Islamic organizations, drug 
trafficking and separatism. For these reasons, Central Asian countries, Russia and 
China continue on preparing for the upcoming future. While Afghanistan-
USrelations have an impact on Uzbek security policy and its reflections on Russian 
security policy approach, domestic dynamics and leadership traditions have also 
direct impact on the Uzbek foreign policy and security policy. 
Uzbekistan is considereda double-landlocked countrythat is located in the heart of 
Central Asia. It borders Afghanistan, one of the most unstable countries in the 
world. Uzbek population is the highest ethnic group in the region and exceeds 
every Central Asian state including Afghanistan. Thus,Uzbekistan with its large 
population has more powerful militaryresourcesthanother central Asian nations. 
This fact has a direct influence on the country’s security policy. Moreover, the 
relations with US, Russia, China, Iran and regional organizations had an impact on 
Uzbek foreign policy in the region since its independence.
Russia’s presence in Central Asia (both in its past and present form)has always 
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been and is still an important strategic factor for the regional countries. For this 
reason, it is important to understand the process of Russian foreign policy and 
security policy approach towards Central Asia, particularly after the rise of 
President Putin in 2000. Contemporary Russian foreign policy is highly dependent 
on Russian energy policy and Central Asia isinevitablepart of this strategy. 
Regarding to existing pipelines, resources and future projects, Uzbekistan is on
Russian energy policy agenda due to its energy export oriented economy. Therefore, 
security of Uzbekistan, Uzbek membership in Russian-led regional organizations 
and NATO withdrawal in 2014 consist main priorities of Kremlin. Despite the ups 
and downs of Uzbek foreign policy and security policy, Kremlin maintain its 
connection with Uzbek leader whether he is close to US alignment or not. 
Particularly the internal crisis of Uzbekistan had accelerated the diplomatic 
relations between Russian and Uzbekistan several times. Conversely in 2012 
Tashkent once again withdrew from CSTO and even blocked the passage of some 
military vehicles for SCO military exercise (Turkkazak 2013). It is tremendously 
important to understand why Tashkent keep distance to Russia in terms of Russian 
security policy for the upcoming security gap in the region. 
2. Uzbek Foreign Policy and Security Policy 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy intellectuals have 
cogitated that Uzbekistan has a key role in the Central Asia geopolitics. For 
example, Mackinder referred to it in 1904 as a “geographical pivot” (Megoran 
2004). Uzbekistan with almost 30 million people has the largest population in 
Central Asia.1 The population has increased over the past 60 years, from around 6 
million in 1950s to almost 30 million today. Furthermore, it is estimated that 
population of Uzbekistan will increase to 33 million by 2020. 2 As a double-
landlocked country, Uzbekistan shares contiguous border with Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, along with Afghanistan but no border 
with Russia and China (Megoran 2004). By estimation,thepopulation of Uzbekistan 
together with Uzbek minorities in the neighboring countries constitutes 45% of the 
population of Central Asia (Kurecic 2010). Moreover, Uzbek Diasporain 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran deserves our attention (Kalra&Saxena 
2009). Fumagalli believes that although the presence of Uzbek communities in
                                                       
1 According to official statistics of Uzbekistan, population number reached to 29993 in 2013. The 
State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan Statists, Demographic Information, 
http://www.stat.uz/en/demographic/ accessed 13 August 2013. 
2 World Population Review, Population of Uzbekistan 2013, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/population-of-uzbekistan/ accessed 13 August 2013. 
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neighboring countries is an influential tool for Tashkent, Uzbek foreign policy 
reveals restraint in playing the “Uzbek card” (Fumagalli 2007). Most probably, the 
reason is that in case of deportation from these countries, Uzbekistan is unwilling 
to welcome these groups. On the other hand Uzbekistan hosts the largest military 
power in the region and such a military strength certainlycreates a space for 
maneuvering its foreign and security policy to more independent and proactive 
areas (Megoran 2004). Since the independence of Uzbekistan, the country sent 
military support to pro-government faction for Tajik civil war, conducted an 
unauthorized operation in foreign territory and unilaterally demarcated and mined 
state borders (Fumagalli 2007, Efegil 2009). And after September 11, Uzbek 
military strength received a particular attention from US forces and it served the 
first US military entrance to the region.
The Uzbek constitution grants the president virtually limited powers regarding 
toforeign policy making. Uzbek President Kerimov consciously refers to “Amir 
Timur” and his diplomacy tradition as one of the pillars of the Uzbek foreign policy. 
By doing this President Kerimov establishes a direct connection with Timur and 
enhances his authority and prestige (Anceschi 2010). Anceshi (2010) divides the 
Uzbek foreign policy approaches into three phases. During the first period (1991-
1999)Uzbekistan utilized a disentanglement strategy operating simultaneously at 
bilateral and multilateral levels. For instance, Uzbekistan joined to GU(U)AM in 
order to find an alternative to CIS which is considered as the Russian-led 
organization, strengthened relations with the West and, most importantly, was 
established its position of regional leadership. In the second phase, between 2000 
and 2005, Uzbek foreign policy continued to pursue disengagement from Russia. 
Following the September 11th, the rapprochement of Uzbek-US relations was 
promptly spearheaded in the areas of military bases (Karshi-Khanabad Base). 
During the third phase, which is between 2005 and 2010, the re-rapprochement of 
Uzbek-Russia relations has begunas a result of the US critics of the Andijan events 
and the Color revolution, which took place in Russia's Near Abroad.
Nevertheless,thekey element of the Uzbek foreign policy since the independence is 
based on pursuing an independent foreign policy after all. This characteristic 
feature of the Uzbek foreign policy obviously accelerated after the establishment of 
close ties with the US. One of the factors behind this development was foreign 
assistance and loans of US government to Tashkent in terms of economic and 
military needs (Wilhelmsen&Flikke 2011). Bohr (2004) argues that since 1991 
Uzbekistan has consolidated its position as regional hegemon in order to replace 
Kremlin’s dominant power in Central Asia, which became apparent after the 
September 11 events. Uzbek leader Kerimov who has ruled the country since 1990 
believes that due to Uzbekistan’s strategic importance and being the strongest 
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nation in the region, it had a legitimate right to claim regional leadership. Thus 
according to Kerimov, Uzbekistan alone could serve for the stability of the region 
(Efegil 2009). One of Uzbek efforts to replace Moscow in the region was to 
establish ofCentral Asian Union by the initiative of Tashkent. The organization was 
created as the Central Asia Union in 1994 and then it was renamed as the Central 
Asian Economic Community in 1998. At the beginning of 2000’s the organization 
was redesigned to strengthen military and political cooperation among Central 
Asian countries, which was perceived as an alternative to the Russian influence in 
the region (Kazantsev 2010).
Iran is another important actor concerning Central Asia and security issues in the 
region since the beginning of 1990s. Iran revealed as a candidate actor to fulfill the 
power gap in the region with Turkey and China. Both Russia and the U.S. tried to 
prevent expansion of Iranian influence in the region regarding toits economic, 
political and cultural ties. Therefore Russia chose to develop its relation with 
Tehran in order to control foreign trade and energy routes by making Iran depend 
on Russian arms and nuclear technology sales in return for a non-aggressive policy 
in Central Asia. AlternativelyWashington opposed all the actions of Iran towards 
Central Asia and hoping to cut the ties between the regions it also increased the 
international sanctions against Tehran (Blank 1995).
The NATO decision to leave Afghanistan in 2014 has triggered discussions on the 
future of Central Asian countries as well as Uzbekistan. Instability of Afghanistan 
always played an important role on domestic and international relations of 
Uzbekistan with its extremist Islamic community. Fazendeiro (2003) thinks that 
Uzbek foreign policy is regularly shifting through greater independence rather that 
developing regional cooperation as written in Uzbek official political doctrine –
Mustaqilik(independence). However, as Fazendeiro (2003) pointed out that Afghan 
and Uzbek economic relations has developed through the last decade. For instance, 
in 2009 total trade between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan rose to $877 million 
thatwas quarter of Afghanistan’s total foreign trade. At this point, Uzbekistan has to 
design a strategy for post-NATO period in Afghanistan whether to act unilaterally 
or multilaterally.
Although Uzbekistan is a secular state, it has been struggling with the Islamist 
groups since the foundation of the country that had deep roots in the regionmore
than centuries. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and HizbutTahrir al-
Islami (HizbutTahrir) began to actively operate especially in the southern part of 
country where the Afghan border is. The IMU used Afghanistan as a base of 
operations into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan at the beginning of 2000s when Taliban 
was in power in Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S.hasenlisted IMU as a terrorist 
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organization due to its connections with Taliban and al-Qaeda. On the other hand, 
while the U.S. was ignoring HizbutTahrir as a terrorist organization like IMU, 
Karimov claimed that HizbutTahrir initiated the Andijan event in 2005, which led 
toinstabilitywithinUzbekistan(Karagiannis 2006).3 The Uzbek political system is 
mainly characterized by clan politics. According to Starr, clans are the regional 
networks that exists in every country of Central Asia. Theyare based on close 
economic and political ties and accent. These regional networks are extremely 
powerful, reflecting the diverse emirates and local power centers of earlier 
centuries (Starr 2006).4Karagiannis (2006) says that; “The clan-based nature of 
Uzbek politics has encouraged the establishment of patron-client relations, which 
create winners and losers, undermine the people’s faith in meritocracy, and produce 
latent conflict in social relations.” Furthermore, Markowitz (2012) considers 
Uzbekistan as a very controversial country due to its highly centralized decision-
making, brutally repressive and autocratic structure. Thus, the regime is capable of 
high levels of control over society, politics, media, and economy, all of which 
requires significant state power.
Central Asia is a quite productive region in terms of having regional organizations, 
namely CIS (Common Independent States), Eurasec (Eurasian Economic 
Community), CU (Customs Union), SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), CSTO (Common Security Treaty 
Organization) and finally Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) 
(Tolipov 2007).5 Uzbekistan is currently a member of CIS (1994), Eurasec (2005), 
SCO (2001), ECO (1992), CACO (2004) but not a member of CSTO (joined 1994, 
withdrew 1999 and rejoined in 2006) since last year, GUAM since 2005 and never 
ever close to become a member of CU so far. In addition to these organizations 
Uzbekistan also signed a Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO in 1994 and 
President Karimov attended various summits of NATO in Europe.6
3. Russian Foreign Policy and Security Policy Towards Central Asia 
Central Asia has always been a significant region since the establishment of the 
new Russian state. However, the rise of Putin to the Russian presidency is a turning 
                                                       
3 CNN, Thousand of Uzbeks Fleeing, May 15, 2005,
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/14/uzbekistan/
4 For more details Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006.
5 The authors have added or brought out some organizations from the original text of the source. 
6Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Uzbekistan, 
http://mfa.uz/eng/inter_cooper/intern_organiz/uzb_nato/ accessed on August 15, 2013.
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point in both Russian and Central Asian political history. In the first days of his 
Presidency, Vladimir Putin gave the signals of upcoming Russian foreign policy 
interests in his millennium article that was published at the end of 1999. The main 
theme of the article was to restore under a strong state; overcoming backwardness 
by establishing a market economy in Russia; and reviving a sense of nationhood in 
post-Soviet Russia (Gaddy&Kuchins 2008). Afterwards the idea of ‘Multipolarity’ 
emerged among Kremlin decision-makers and they put this new argument into the 
Russian important document. Here Trenin (2003a) claims that Putin has abandoned 
Yeltsin’s foreign policy agenda, with desire to play an oversized role in world 
affairs and a quest for multipolarity to balance America. The 9/11 attacks provided 
a further impetus for Putin to seek a pragmatic relationship with Washington, free 
for the most part from the overheated rhetoric and bluster that often characterized 
the Primakov/Yeltsin era. Putin was the first foreign leader (Dougherty 2002) 
contacted Bush in the hours following the attacks on New York and Washington 
(Mankoff 2006). Despite the opposition of the Russia's Security Council, Putin 
supported Washington’s anti-terrorist campaign without preconditions and accepted 
the American deployment in Central Asia (Rywkin 2003). Blank (2008) 
summarized the concept of multipolarity as; “the entire concept of multipolarity 
implies a virtual veto over the unilateralist impulses of any great power: other 
powers align against any aggressive power in an effort to preserve the status quo 
and to ensure that any major challenges in the international system require 
consensus.”
In the first months after Putin’s election three key documents were adopted in 2000: 
the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy 
Concept. In the Foreign Policy document it was re-sealed that post-Soviet countries 
–Near Abroad- were as the main priority (Kazantsev 2008). When Russian 
Federation was recognized as the legal inheritor of the Soviet Union in UN and 
other international organizations, other former 14 states declared their sovereignty 
and they are known as Near Abroad states. Therefore Central Asian states also 
belong to the Russian Near Abroad concept because Russia has vital political and 
economic interests in the region. Furthermore, Russia is also concerned about the 
growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and its possible spread to 
Russian Muslim communities (Donaldson &Nogee 2009). Russia is worried about 
Taliban movement within Afghanistan and their activities in the republics of 
Central Asia (Yakushik 2009).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the “Great Game” politics has become a 
subject for numerous discussions and disputes among scholars. Scholars tried to 
figure out whether the “New Great Game” will appear in Central Asia or not. The 
classic Great Game represents the power competition between the Russian Empire 
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and Great Britain in the 19th century over the hegemony of Central Asia, which was 
also the gateway to Afghanistan and India (Abilov 2012). However, many scholars 
argue that New Great Game is different than the old one. Tolipov says the New 
Great Game is multilevel, multinational and multifaceted, too many actors 
wereinvolved in the game and even Central Asian countries become players 
(Tolipov 2007). Abilov (2012) believethat The United States has taken over the 
leading role from the British. Along with the ever-present Russians, new regional 
powers such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have entered the new arena. 
Therefore after gaining their independence in 1991, five republics of the region 
faced multi-complex security issues, directly connected to foreign policy matters. 
Once again after a century “Great Game” raised and determined the agenda of the 
countries in the region. Just this time the question changed as Nourzhanov (2009) 
quotes to Starr: the region will either come under the hegemony of an outside rival 
power –Russia, China, the US- or the region will be in chaos. 
The Russian economy is mainly dominated by energy export incomes that are also 
dependent to Central Asian resources either controlling supply routes 
orprovidingsurplus resources for exporting to West. Therefore, high oil prices and 
its direct impact on the increase of natural gas prices had served Russian 
development since 1999 (Hanson 2009). For Russian energy policy, Central Asian 
policy also includes the Caspian energy policy dynamics. For this reason,
controlling the direction and volumes of exports from the states of this region is 
essential for Russia in order to reduce competition for its own energy exports on 
the international markets (Nanay 2009). In this sense, Energy policy began to play 
an important role in Uzbekistan after the independence. It was correlated with the 
capital-intensive industrialization policy and overall macroeconomic policy on 
domestic stabilization (Djakhangir 2005). Since the beginning of Putin’s presidency, 
Uzbekistan gradually saw some progress in cooperation with Russia. In 2002, 10-
year contract was signed between Russia and Uzbekistan to supply gas to Russia 
including Russian investments into the hydrocarbon deposits. Afterwards, Russia 
and Uzbekistan signed a 15-year PSA with Gazprom on gas extraction at the 
Shokhpakhty gas fields, and Russia's Lukoil signed an agreement for 35 years to 
develop the Kandym gas field. Following the improvement in relations with Russia 
after the crackdown in Uzbekistan’s Andijan (Cooley 2008) 7 region in 2005, 
Gazprom announced future investments in Uzbek gas projects (Nygren 2008). On 
May 2005, Uzbekistan quit the GUUAM grouping which was generally viewed as 
                                                       
7 “…Andijan events: On Friday, 13 May 2005, thousands of demonstrators gathered around Babur 
Square in the centre of the city. Uzbek security forces dealt with the protesters ruthlessly, surrounding 
the demonstrators in armored vehicles and proceeding to fire into the crowd. The Uzbek government 
received unequivocal backing for its actions from Russia and China, but crack down in Andijan sent 
shock waves through the West.”
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pro-Western.
In terms of regionalization strategy of Russia, it is significant to look at the various 
regional organizations in the region. Firstly, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) is a regional organization formed by the majority of the Soviet 
Republics in December 1991. First the leaders of the Soviet Republics of Belarus 
and Ukraine met in Belarus where they signed an agreement to establish CIS. 
Afterwards, in December 21, 1991, the leaders of the other eleven Soviet republics 
met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and signed the CIS Charter. As a result of this 
document, the USSR was resolved and it was stipulated that all signatory states of 
the charter were both sovereign and independent states. The main aims behind the 
formation of CIS were to provide aid for newly independent former Soviet 
republics in foreign and economic fields (Peimani 2009).
Secondly, the Collective Security Treaty was signed on May 15, 1992, by Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, in Tashkent as the 
first security document of the Central Asian states. Afterwards Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Belarus also signed the treaty by the end of year 1993. The treaty confirmed 
the will of all participating states to abstain from the use of threat of force. The 
important point of the treaty was that signatory states would not be able to join 
other military alliances and an aggression against one signatory would be perceived 
as an aggression against all (Obydenkova2001) as inNATO Article 5. On October 7, 
2002, the six members of the Collective Security Treaty signed a charter in 
Chisinau, Moldova while expanding the organization and renaming itselfto the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (Obydenkova 2001). Since its 
formation in 2002, CSTO has served not only to train Central Asian officers in 
Russian military academies but has also been a framework for delivery of both 
Soviet-era and most modern military equipment to the Central Asian militaries at 
Russian internal prices (Frost 2009). 
Thirdly, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) consists of Russia, China, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Although it was announced 
during the establishment process that the SCO is not a military alliance, the 
organization adopted priorities over fighting on terrorism, religious extremism and 
separatism in 2001. Moreover Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) was 
created in Tashkent a year later as a tool for security of the members (Tolipov 
2007). In July 2002, SCO adopted a strategic declaration that in case of 
extraordinary situations –threatening peace, stability and security in the region-
SCO members will immediately start contacting for joint operational reaction 
(Tolipov 2007). Aris suggests that SCO has adopted flexible definitions of Islamist 
extremism and terrorism. For this reason, when the Uzbek government came under 
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heavy criticism due to its implementations during the Andijan events in 2005, 
Russia, China and other Central Asian republics did not join in the criticism of the 
Uzbek government (Airs 2009). After the Andijanevents Uzbekistan was 
increasingly under influence from China and Russia to join SCO. The final 
statement of the summer 2005 SCO summit directly demanded that non-regional 
powers eventually remove military bases stationed in member countries and called 
for a timeline for such withdrawal that directly targeted US military bases. As a 
result, on August 2005, Uzbek authorities requested the U.S. to vacate the base at 
Karshi-Khanabad within 180 days (Wilhelmsen&Flikke 2011).
4. Understanding New Approach of Tashkent Policy and Its Counterterrorism 
Aspects
According to Muzalevsky (2009), Russia-Uzbek relations have never been stable. 
In 1998, Uzbekistan withdrew from CSTO and joined GU(U)AM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) which was considered Western 
oriented and anti-Russian alliance. After the September 11 events, Russia 
supported the American use of military bases in Central Asia and thus Uzbekistan 
established a direct contact with Washington by hosting a Karshi-Khanabad airbase 
for U.S. military use. The Karshi-Khanabad Air Base near the Uzbek-Afghan 
border, which came to be known as K2 by the Americans, served as an important 
bridgehead for projecting American force onto Afghanistan. However, five months 
after the Andijan events in 2005 Putin and Karimov signed a Treaty of Allied 
Relations that included the possibility of Russian military re-settlement into 
Uzbekistan. In a few months Uzbekistan joined Russian-led organizations such as 
Eurasian Economic Community and CSTO. In addition to these developments-
serious energy treaties havesigned between Russia and Uzbekistan (Nixey 2012). 
Nevertheless, Uzbekistan didn’twelcome Russian military presence on its own 
territory. Megoran suggests that Moscow had two political objectives that Uzbeks 
opposed: firstly, the Russian military presence would constrain Tashkent’s 
development as a western-leaning potential geopolitical competitor in Central Asia,
and, secondly, Uzbeks felt the need to have military options for possible 
intervention in Uzbekistan in the future (Megoran 2004). 
In 2012 Uzbekistan withdrew from CSTO second time in its history. Laruelle 
argues that several reasons explain Tashkent’s second withdrawn from CSTO. 
Firstly, Uzbekistan has always problems with the values of the CSTO and it hinders 
Uzbek’s autonomous foreign policy approach. Secondly, Uzbekistan’s goal is to 
free itself from Russian domination and it is becoming impossible as long as 
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Tashkent stays in the alliance. Thirdly, Uzbekistan is willing to create its own 
regional hegemony by reviving Turkestan idea that is a part of Turanism and 
directly challenges the Eurasianist ideas of Kazakh President Nazarbayev (Lauelle 
2012). Moreover, although Uzbek-U.S. relations are not at peak, acceptance of the 
Russian proposal that any new third country military deployments in the region 
require the unanimous support of all members-sates was against Uzbek security 
policy. Uzbekistan wants to keep a negotiation tool for U.S. always in its hand and 
it becomes impossible after this rule accepted by the CSTO. And finally, Russia 
and Uzbekistan were negotiating to finalize the establishment of a Collective Rapid 
Reaction Force which Tashkent was not interested (Laruelle 2012).
In human history, terrorism is widely recognized as the world most famous enemy 
of the humanity. We should not underestimate this threat: terrorism isequivalent to
annihilation with far-reaching and destructive effects; it is the cruelest of crimes 
against humanity. Its remains have turned neighbors into enemies and have made 
our societies and the whole world unsafe for living. Its aims and applications are 
global and uncompromising (Micheal 2003). Neither terrorism nor perpetrators are 
newfacts. Socio-economic explanations of terrorism suggest that various forms of 
deprivation drive people to terrorism, or that people are more susceptible to 
recruitment by organizations using terrorist tactics.Definitely, terrorism with its 
destructive power has reshaped the world we live in. Now we live in the world 
characterized by increasing violence and conflicts. This, in turn, has led to the 
emergence of mistrust, fear, and division. And nowterrorismrepresents a significant 
new threat to international justice, peace and security.
The term ‘terrorism’ describes a particularly heinous methodology that is used to 
create or cause change within a society. It is a political tool directed at achieving a 
specific goal through the deliberate targeting of noncombatants. In other words, 
terrorism is an activity that engages groups and individuals – this term describes 
what they do, but not who they are. NowadaysUzbekistan is boosting its security 
measures and warning residents of an increased risk of a terrorist attack. 
Authorities have "credible information" that has prompted the precautionary efforts, 
especially in Tashkent. "In addition to the escalation of terrorist activity across the 
region and the world as a whole by groups that made a name with their previous 
terrorist acts in our country – the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and 
Salafist groups – we now have information that terrorists are grouping on the 
border of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan," National Security Service 
terrorism analyst said though he declined to discuss specifics about the available 
intelligence data for security reasons. "This poses a danger to Uzbekistan" (Sadi& 
Khan 2013).
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IMU and al-Qaeda militants have reportedly been massing in Badakhshan Province, 
Afghanistan, which is closer to Tajikistan than to Uzbekistan but nonetheless, it is 
worrisome for the Uzbeks. The Afghan government wasted no time and quickly 
started working with Tajikistan to eliminate the problem. Din Muhammad, a senior 
politician, said "We are tackling the issue in collaboration with our neighbor and 
are controlling of [the militants'] activities," Din Muhammad said. "They have been 
sandwiched, and soon the region will be made clear" (Sadi& Khan 2013). One 
challenge is that extremists have broadened their communication networks, using 
the Internet to spread their propaganda. The Internet is accessible and insufficiently 
regulated, has an unlimited potential readership, and allows a rapid flow of 
information. Groups that achieve their goals through terrorism have benefited from 
these inherent advantages of the Internet, and this is very hard to combat. Lt. Col. 
Anwar Salimov of the Interior Ministry, referring to a report by various law 
enforcement agencies, said that this situation made it easier for terrorists to 
collaborate across international borders.
Now Uzbekistan is more focused on what's happening with extremists on its own 
territory. Vehicles entering and leaving the capital will be checked and security has 
been boosted at strategically important buildings, in outdoor public areas like parks 
and on public transportation. The primary goal is to ensure the safety of Uzbeks, 
and, as a result, authorities will enhance security measures across the borders.The 
fight against terrorism is a common task for all countries in the world, it is a 
«collective» responsibility for the whole international community. Preventing 
terrorist threat will be successful only if the states abandon the policy of ‘double 
standards’ and interact with each other strictly in accordance with universal 
principles of international law.
In our opinion, possible measures against international terrorism could be the 
following:
1) To eliminate communication between various terrorist organizations and 
criminal groups operating on the territory of any state;
2) To shut down all sites and Internet resources that contains material of a terrorist 
nature and propaganda of extremist ideas;
3) To create a common international database on terrorism, which will serve as a 
tool for collecting and analyzing information on terrorist elements, groups, 
movements and organizations around the world;
4) To hold regular dialogue with the leading authoritative politicians, cultural and 
religious leaders to disseminate ideas to combat terrorism, explaining the terrorists' 
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real objectives, thus creating in civilians’ minds the image of the real enemy – the 
terrorism;
5) To formulate the so-called ‘counter-terrorist ideology’.
5. Conclusion
The development of geopolitical processes over the past decadedemonstrated that 
Central Asia has become one of the key Eurasian regions, with major impact on the 
overall climate of the continental and global security. Central Asia’s influence is 
felt on several fronts, primarily those of combating international terrorism and 
supplying oil and natural gas. At the same time, the region’s growing importance 
carries certain risks. As the region becomes an integral part of the global system of 
security and the economy, it also becomes sensitive to the effects of the multiple 
factors and processes that traditionally determine the course of global political, 
economic, cultural, and ideological development. In this sense, as Ilkhamovpointed 
out, Uzbekistan is highly significant for Russian interests not only due to its energy 
resources, but also for its Geo-strategic location. Although Uzbekistan is a double-
landlocked country, it is situated in the ‘heart’ of the Central Asia including Russia, 
China, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Caspian Region (Ilkhamov 2007). 
Uzbekistan is a unique case in Central Asia in terms of pursuing independent 
foreign policy. According to this strategy, Tashkent enjoys regional organizations 
although it has reservations. In 2012 Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO, which 
is the Russian-led security organization and has agreed on not allowing third party 
military bases in the region without unanimous agreement of the members. 
Afterwards, Uzbekistan blocked passage of Kazakh military vehicles for SCO 
military exercise in Tajikistan. This situation raised the questions whether 
Uzbekistan tries to recover its relations with the U.S. or not. It seems that 
Uzbekistan prefers the role of an observer in order to maintain its independent 
foreign policy as long as it can. Moreover, this does not mean the cut of economic 
or energy relations or a challenge for Russian security policy priorities. In sum, it 
gives Uzbekistan another diplomatic card for further negotiations with either 
Russia or the USA whether it is related to economics and security. 
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Summary
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Uzbekistan is one of the significant states of Central Asia considering its relatively high 
population and military strength in comparison with other Central Asian states. We should 
not forget the fact that Uzbekistan has the most combat-ready and well-equipped armed 
forces in the region that have direct military experience in special operations in the 
mountains. Given this fact and the presence of a large Uzbek diaspora in neighboring 
countries, it is easy enough to understand why Tashkent pursues an independent policy and 
strives for leadership in Central Asia. However, the permanent President of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan Islam Karimov failed to achieve regional leadershipdue to on domestic political 
and economic reasons. But he was able to solve a number of major policy objectives: to 
achieve political stability, to suppress the influence of Islamists, to provide external security 
of Uzbekistan and to hold inter-clan balance. Although Uzbekistan, like other Central Asian 
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nations, is a landlocked country, it has no direct border with the Russian Federation and 
China. Instead,Uzbekistan has border with Afghanistan and with its strategic location 
Uzbekistan will have a substantial role to play in the future of Central Asia. Nevertheless, 
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy had displayed ups and downs concerning the security and 
economic regionalization of Kremlin’s foreign policy strategies. In the summer of 2012, 
Uzbekistan suspended its membership in CSTO, which was the forthcoming main security 
organization of the Eurasia and even blocked the passage of Kazakh military vehicles from 
its territory for the SCO exercises in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Uzbekistan perceives that 
fundamental Islamic movements are a threat to its security and future. On the other hand, 
Uzbek leadership is waiting for the possible geopolitical changes in a region due to NATO’s 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. This paper seeks to analyze the factors behind 
Uzbekistan’s recent foreign policy activities and conclusions.
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